

(Massacre as "What a Certain Technology")

(industry, comp.) and Service can do

(Remember. or, CA military & Draft War

(as juveniles, urban or rural).

(at most: male tolerance of, indifference toward, lower mobilization against, massacre, as "part of a job")

Hyp: Secret World of Male Sex

≈ Secret World of Male Violence

(fraying)

auto\preface

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Friday, 28 June 1988

but ≈ Secret World of Massacre

which is social/org/ bureaucratic/

state (male so far as there are male day with technology & war); not

The World of Sex/ The world of violence

Male, organized, violence: massacre, mass murder

Henry Miller: to write what is not written down in books

Not love, sex; fucking, not love-making; horniness, not desire

Not specified by Miller, now seen to be implicit: male sex

(Not all men, all the time, versus women never; most men some of

the time; a small (?) minority of women, like a much larger

fraction of men, much of the time). Attitudes: unattachment,

"other as object," self-gratification, momentary pleasure; and

almost constant readiness for this. Arousal.

Similar gender differences, insufficiently explored: sex;

violence; technology; secrecy; risk-taking (of doing or suffering violence).

Me, earlier: to reveal, publish, what is written in secret books, not intended for the public.

Like pornography, forbidden (to write or read, to think, to desire, to feel, to do); not to be acknowledged publicly; to be read secretly, in private.

Unlike pornography...

- Secrets and secret societies. (Though female secrets: be (subordinated) inner reality, attitudes. Females "can't keep secrets" (promises, commitments... change their minds...)

Bound to be similarities (in what is forbidden, taboo).

But: secrets I revealed: Not sexually arousing, attractive

(except to someone really sick!) Forbidden, secret, because they involve breaking moral codes and laws; publication would have

political consequences, lead to condemnation, loss of status,

condemnation or punishment. Antinomian: breaks/ rejects all laws, restraints.

Implications for physical destruction of societies--our own and others--are entirely different. For physical, societal,

catastrophe.

What I revealed was significant largely for what--comprehensive as it was--it did not show: good reasons for what we were doing; evidence supporting official assertions to the public, as to what was real, what was believed, what was aimed for, what was planned, what was expected. Though the Pentagon Papers revealed quite different propositions on all these latter matters, it did not convincingly provide reasons for the actions, plans, intentions. They raised anew the question, rather than answering it: Why were we in Vietnam? Why were we continuing to destroy it?

(movies)

Still, an attraction for me (and not only me, among men) for of imagery of violence: in particular, the duel, battle among men, armed or trained or ready for violence, a violent elite, volunteers (not, violence against the unwilling, the "weak," the unarmed, unthreatening, the "innocent": women, children, old, sick, "civilians" (in war)).

Violence in war is increasingly, as in civil life, violence against women and children, civilians; in nuclear war, overwhelmingly so. (Apocalypse Now; Steel). (See North or Buckley).
Though it is the dumb that legitimizes war (and police work); not brutally to meet results as it did Vietnam - see Skidmore.

Furthermore, for me, a preoccupation with catastrophe: physical, and social. An ambivalence toward catastrophe, like ambivalence toward violence? (Or, for many women, ambivalence--rather than pure revulsion--toward "sex", even fantasies of rape?)

General hypothesis: what is "unduly" risked, is less strongly or unequivocally feared or disliked than "normally"; the attitude of the risk-taker may be more than normally ambivalent, seeing some advantage or attraction to the "loss."

What is feared by most secret-keepers--with good reason--is social isolation, ostracism, exile, if they reveal the secrets: the loss of friends and relationships (as well as career): as if they were exiled, or emigrated; as if they had stepped out of a space capsule without an umbilical cord.

I experienced this: like other members of ARDIS (or Ingvar Bratt). And I chose it. Without, to be sure, fully realizing that it would be permanent. In this, too, I was like the other whistle-blowers. But if we were "naive" about our former colleagues (Bratt, for example, expected approval from most of them; as well as renewed friendship "when the dust settled"), why was this? Why were we (if we were) less realistic about the consequences of our revelations--as well as more willing to accept some risk (which we may have underestimated)?

For my part: I had found myself in outer space, in exile, once before, my most important relationships severed forever. That time I did not choose it, I was pushed out of the capsule; that is an experience I have sought to avoid. Yet, I survived it. And it even had a liberating meaning for me (along with a sense of horror, loss and guilt too great to face or feel consciously, that I can only infer). Thus, my willingness, perhaps even compulsion (Freud's repetition syndrome) to repeat this trauma--this time with mastery, control--as, in Vietnam, I chose to risk death.

And that earlier experience was one of violent catastrophe: in a technology steered by a man, my father, who (obedient to the commands of a woman, my mother) risked falling asleep at the wheel, and lost the gamble: killing his "superior," his wife, and an "innocent," his daughter, my sister (and breaking my knee).

That gives me a special perspective on, and sensitivity to, the possibility of catastrophe. And has a lot to do, no doubt, with my obsession with warning others about it (a typical survivor pattern), and acting otherwise to reduce its probability. And striving to understand it...how was it/is it possible? How could "they" work to prepare it, to make it more likely? How did I?

Now I embark on the work I have been preparing to do for thirty years, the greater part of my life. To write down what I have learned of the answers to these questions; and before that, to write of the experiences and perceptions that led me, as an

adult, to these questions. Experiences that led me to a preoccupation with understanding the probability--and acting to reduce it--of certain social catastrophes: direct or indirect involvement in civil wars or aggression; possible first-use of nuclear weapons; the possibility of general nuclear war.

In particular, what I mean to write, now, is "what has not been written down in books," by me or by others, neither for the public nor in secret. Secrets, this time of attitudes, values, expectations, of readiness, that are recorded, if at all, only in most-secret, most carefully guarded notes ("higher" than Top Secret--the classification of the Pentagon Papers) and are more generally not written down at all: revealed in writing only between the lines, in omissions, or alluded to by codewords and euphemisms; with the same true even of highly private conversation, which is, however, occasionally explicit.

Miller: the poet of horniness, secret male readiness for "unsentimental," unattached sex.

See male arousal, for images of violence; Bureaucrats readiness to organize it.

My theme: secret male institutional readiness for massacre. *Both threats and execution, including nuclear.*
And its potential--in a world of competing male-dominated institutions (do certain hierarchical institutions take on a "male character" in orientation toward conflict and violence, somewhat regardless of the gender of their leadership and members?), nation-states and movements aspiring to become or lead nation-states--for overwhelming catastrophe.

These were the experiences and perceptions that led me, this time by choice, to step out of the space capsule in 1969 (again to survive, though without any of my former attachments). They shaped the concerns that have continued to preoccupy me since the war ended in 1975: my efforts to understand, as well as to change, certain realities, of attitudes as well as actions.

In order:

--C3 work.

--JCS answer to question on deaths;

--in particular, their awareness, their readiness to tell, in writing (graph: a straight line, approximate, but...like the bound-in-leather official history of the extermination of the Warsaw Ghetto). Then: the planning, before and after, in the light of this awareness.

--(Like my feeling about HST's announcement of Hiroshima.)

(At least the JCS had the "decency"--Himmler's word--to keep this calculation so secret I had come to believe it did not exist).

(No such corresponding calculated prediction exists on paper--does it?--for the outcome of the Final Solution. Nor any order for the plan or program signed by Hitler. Note JFK's reluctance to sign a BNSP; so far as I know, he successfully avoided ever authorising the war plans in writing).

--I wrote war plans...

--End of missile gap. (As in Vietnam, my feeling of "How could they?" should be posed, as Gelb pointed out, "How could I, how could we?" Yet my feelings were typically aroused by discovery that others, above me, had known things I didn't know, or knew that things I believed weren't true, in ways that made their behavior newly problematic for me. "How could they, knowing what they knew, believing what they believed?" Yet as Gelb suggests, it is useful at least heuristically to make guesses based on empathy, exploring our similarity and my knowledge of my own motivations. If I was misled about certain things (which perhaps they weren't) might they not have been misled, or "self-deceived" about others, in ways that shaped their behavior? May not the ways I was recruited or manipulated into wrongful participation provide insights into the ways they came to be abusive authorities, perhaps without being any more "malevolent," on balance, than I was?

--Cuba II: Nitze's expectation of general war (10%: or as he paraphrases this now: "no chance." JFK: 1-3--1/2. My reaction then to what they had done, in this light. (My knowledge in 1964 of the chances they had really run). In 1987: new knowledge of JFK's williness to run, on Saturday, risks he believed to be unnecessary and unwarranted (and which were greater than he knew).

--(Study of nuclear crises: Suez, etc.)

--Vietnam 1964 (incidentally: "readiness" for Tonkin Gulf crisis and "response": the 94 (?) target list, the draft resolution). (General issue from crisis study: "cocking" for crisis, as a result for previous crisis (readiness; need to show toughness, win a victory) (See Lebanon-Grenada, Vietnam-Nicaragua...drawing lines...Cuba II--Brezhnev buildup...See Ford on "cocking" and stability; see preemption, readiness, as factors in "strategic instability."))

--Vietnam, 1965 (again, readiness for Rolling Thunder, and my participation; secrecy of ground combat escalation in April.): above all, choice of unlimited escalation (yet surprisingly deceptive; and, as in 1961, Presidentially-limited, in terms this time of bombing) in the face of JCS "realistic" estimates (vs. Quagmire Myth). Especially in the light of 1985- revelations of authoritative civilian warnings of "catastrophe." How could McNamara and LBJ...?

--Vietnam, 1968 on: the continuation of the war seven years after Tet, by a thoroughly disillusioned bureaucracy.

--The reaction at RAND to our letter; and of all my former colleagues to my revelation of the Pentagon Papers. (How could they not...?)

--US secret acceptance and encouragement of--and even involvement in--massacre in Indonesia in 1965 (and later in Central and South America): learned, to my shock, in 1977.

All these involve my awareness of secret attitudes and readiness, mostly not written down anywhere, which meant that common understandings of the behavior were wrong, and which raised questions about the real motivations and meanings of the behavior which have taken me many years to begin to answer.

I have also learned some things it is time to write down about human readiness to confront, resist and change destructive and catastrophically dangerous institutionalized behavior. (Behavior for which people would be put in institutions if they did it on their own; but which they do en masse, with social approval, because they are in institutions). Things that may yet save us.

Kaysen.1

Notes: CW Jew; Arab dress/Kraft; CW\Jews: Kraft, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Rostow, Schlesinger Jim, Safire, me, Kahn, Wohlstetter, Marshall, Perle, Burt; (CW Irish Catholics: Rowen; Buchanan...

Game theory; my thesis; his article, mine. Soc Fel: tied to Harvard appointment?; like McG B, Schles, Cline, Cord Meyer (intell?).

His disappointment, shock, at my going into Marines. (He and L knew of Wilson fellowship? Of Marines?) His attitude toward military; but also, toward armed force, power.

His early radicalism (merely mentioned once); parents? (see Yarmolinsky) (Rostow). Meeting on founding of Dissent: Howe, Sweezy; my question; his reproof.

His working on bombing in WWII; association with Hitch? Rostow? Nitze? (SBS?) Rowen? Kissinger. Work at RAND.

With me in 1961: JSCP; Delegation. Pres attitude on JSCP? His first strike plan! (Why did he talk to interviewers?) (What did he say to Mintz about delegation? Why won't he confirm?)

His attitudes on nuclears? Attitude to Oppenheimer? (Kaysen is doing big series on nuclear era for WGBH, like VN series).

He replaces Oppenheimer at Institute for Advanced Study.

Trouble with physicists; over Bellah. (Talk to Bellah; and to Karen Hermassi; Sally Binford recalls him, from...?)

Friend ? of Richard Goodwin.

Attitude on missile gap? Why no thought of test ban then?

Attitude to parents on his hare lip; why not fixed? How affected his life? (see my comparable problem).

Talk to Raskin; Joe Kershaw; Burt Klein; Arthur Schlesinger; Yarmo

See his attitude on right-wing dictatorships vs. left-wing (1971).

Why his ambivalence to me? (Ha)

Writing problem?!

Lack of achievement, fulfillment?

Relation to Bundy; who also turns out to have been anti-nuclear, along with

McNamara.

His relation, as a Jew, to Harvard, Establishment, military/war/bombing, Power, Exec